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PERSPECTIVES FOR THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY – THE
AFTERMATH OF THE FINANCIAL
SHOCKS:





The Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the
University of Munich held its annual CESifo
International Spring Conference at the Academy of
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin on
19 and 20 March 2009.1The conference was entitled
“Perspectives for the Global Economy: The
Aftermath of the Financial Shocks”. A distinctive
feature of this conference was the bringing togeth-
er of the views of experts of financial markets with
economists and experts from the manufacturing
sector.
The first day concentrated on two topics: the ori-
gins and lessons of the financial crisis and the glob-
al economic perspectives by regions. Despite
progress in the rectification of the problems in the
financial market, most of the speakers saw a bleak
outlook not only for 2009 but also for 2010. This
assessment was based on further existing global
imbalances and the time needed for the readjust-
ment of the financial system. Some relief is expect-
ed with the Chinese economy,which has some free-
dom of action to counter the negative effects. Only
Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs pointed out a
brighter outlook, as he saw improvements in the
financial market that will support above all the US
economy.
On the second day speakers examined the prospects
for European manufacturing industries in the com-
ing years. A prolongation of recessive trends into
2010 was the view of the majority of the sectoral
experts. Most dismal were the views on the automo-
tive and the engineering industries as well as on
European housing construction, although there are
major discrepancies between the EU Member States
in the level of overheating in recent years. Even if a
stabilization or a slight increase in output occurs
next year, companies will have to reduce their staff
to adjust to the lower capacity utilization.
World economy and financial crisis
After opening the conference, Ifo President Hans-
Werner Sinn examined the causes of the financial
crisis and its effects on the real economy.To under-
stand the deeper economic reasons for the crisis,
Sinn stressed the need to look beyond the record
US current account deficit, the low US saving rate,
subprime mortgages and the bursting of the real-
estate bubble, and to focus on the aspect of limited
liability.
Limited liability is essential for creating a joint stock
company; one cannot make the individual share-
holder liable for a company’s business.Thus, limited
liability helped make capitalism possible in the first
place. However, one important cause for the finan-
cial crisis lies in the limited liability of the share-
holders. American investment bankers took advan-
tage of this limited liability to the maximum extent:
they used less and less equity capital (4 percent or
less) and borrowed more and more money.They dis-
tributed their profits in order to minimize losses in
turbulent times, and they began to gamble knowing
that the losses exceeding their equity capital would
have to be borne by the creditors or the taxpayers.
But not only Wall Street gambled.Main Street did so
as well,and for a similar reason.Because banks gave
them non-recourse loans, their liability was limited
just like that of banks,and so they bet on house price
increases, borrowing and buying excessively. The
banks securitized the credits, created mortgage-
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in Berlin, 18–19 March 2010.backed securities and sold these to other banks in
order to pass on the risk. The bank that bought the
mortgage-backed securities bundled them into pack-
ages of good and bad claims and created new asset-
backed securities of the Collateralized Debt
Obligations (CDO) variety, which they resold. This
procedure continued, so that at some point, the
banks had lost the overview of the claims they actu-
ally had.
To overcome the crisis, Sinn demands stricter equity
regulation of banks. In that way, banks have a buffer
in case a crisis occurs, and, what is more, they have a
lower incentive to gamble because they have more
to lose in the case of failure. In order to avoid the
competition of laxity among different jurisdictions,
such a solution would have to be implemented joint-
ly by all countries.
The world is currently in its deepest post-war reces-
sion, in fact in the deepest recession since the Great
Depression of 1929. The magnitude of the banking
crisis is even greater than at that time. The United
States is facing tough times, the flow of loans has
been interrupted and many people cannot borrow
anymore.An already highly indebted government is
borrowing even more. This is a continuation of an
unsound development and it will take more than one
presidential term to overcome the crisis.
Kai Carstensen, Head of Ifo’s Business Cycle Ana-
lyses and Survey Department,identified three obsta-
cles to a quick recovery of the world economy. First,
there are painful adjustment processes lying ahead
for the United States. In particular, the current
account is still negative and the consumption share
in GDP is too high. To achieve sustainable growth,
both consumption expenditures and economy-wide
borrowing from abroad have to come down to a sus-
tainable level. So far, the adjustment burden has
mainly been on investment.This is typical for a busi-
ness cycle downturn but it will not be sufficient. But
if consumption falters,this will have strong repercus-
sions on US production activities. Hence, the United
States will not be the growth engine for Europe and
the world economy in the coming years.
Second, the write-downs by banks and other finan-
cial institutions impede their ability to lend as docu-
mented by credit growth numbers and bank lending
surveys. On top of this, the cyclical loan defaults are
still to come and they will hurt banks even more in a
situation of tight balance sheets. In order to prevent
a credit crunch, it is therefore of prime importance
for economic policy to quickly restore a healthy
banking system.
Finally, it is likely that collateral constraints and risk
premia will rise permanently above the levels seen
during the recent boom. Inadequately low pricing of
risk was one of the major causes behind the bubble
in financial markets. Since the crash, most market
participants have been extremely risk-averse, which
is a natural reaction and usual from a cyclical per-
spective. However, the typical pattern according to
which the risk-aversion would disappear again fairly
quickly does not seem to be the most probable sce-
nario this time. In contrast, it is likely that investors
and regulators have learned their lesson. This, in
turn, implies that credit conditions will remain rela-
tively tight for a sustained period of time, in which
capital formation is more costly and hence growth
remains less dynamic than before.
Outlook for financial markets
Axel Bertuch-Samuels, Deputy Director of the Mo-
netary and Capital Markets Department of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund explored the outlook for
financial markets and challenges for policymakers.
In his opinion, risks to financial stability have inten-
sified since October 2008. General macroeconomic
as well as credit risks have risen, spreading in partic-
ular to emerging markets. Although market func-
tioning toward the end of 2008 improved in a num-
ber of asset classes with extensive government sup-
port,the negative interaction between the real econ-
omy and the financial sector has intensified due to
the credit crunch that extends globally. The recent
shock to bank earnings and the global economic
slowdown has put further downward pressure on
bank equity prices and bank systemic risks are at the
most elevated levels of the crisis. In spite of govern-
ment interventions, many banks, as already men-
tioned by Hans-Werner Sinn, need to raise signifi-
cant additional capital to overcome a deep global
economic downturn.
Due to the increasing size and amount of write-offs
borne by financial institutions, accompanied by con-
tinuing funding pressure, policymakers are facing
considerable challenges in dealing with the crisis. In
addition,the lack of credit intermediation and confi-
dence has barred financial institutions from attract-
ing private investors. Not only the banking system
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but also the insurance companies and pension funds
have been hit severely on the asset side.Especially in
Britain and the United States the pension crisis is a
major problem that is looming.
So far, banks have managed to obtain sufficient cap-
ital to offset existing write-downs, but funds have
come increasingly from the public sector. Due to the
worsening credit conditions, estimates of potential
financial sector write-offs on US assets rose from
1.4 trillion US dollars in October 2008 to 2.2 trillion
US dollars in January 2009. But expected losses will
continue to rise and banks will need even more cap-
ital.According to the IMF estimates,expected write-
downs of European and US banks during 2009 and
2010 could result in a net capital shortfall of at least
half a trillion US dollars. Hedge funds and mutual
funds have also been hit badly with losses and heavy
redemptions. Only during the last quarter of 2008,
hedge fund assets halved in value.
The impact on emerging markets has been enor-
mous. Syndicated lending to emerging markets has
declined more than half from the second quarter of
2008 to first quarter of 2009 and bond financing has
contracted by two-thirds in the same period.
Deterioration in asset quality in emerging Europe
may, in turn, be transmitted back to several banking
systems in Western Europe.
Bertuch-Samuels concluded his speech addressing
the challenges for policymakers.The IMF calls for a
three-pronged approach to resolve the crisis: (1) the
provision of adequate liquidity and term-funding
support from central banks, (2) the recapitalization
of viable financial institutions, and (3) measures to
address problem assets.To be effective the financial
policies need to be comprehensive and internation-
ally coordinated. Most important – according to
Bertuch-Samuels – is a comprehensive and coordi-
nated approach framed in a strategy with the follow-
ing elements:
– More emphasis on recapitalization and measures
to deal with distressed assets.A “bad bank” could
be one element.
– Short-run policies need to be consistent with a
long-run vision for a more resilient financial sys-
tem.
– Rules governing procedures should be clear and
comprehensive.
– International cooperation should receive high
priority.
Is the end of global crisis foreseeable?
When will the world recover from the global crisis,
was the question tackled by Jim O’Neill, Head of
Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy
Research for Goldman Sachs in London. After the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, a crisis indicator was
developed by Goldman Sachs to measure the evo-
lution of the crisis in the financial system. Goldman
Sachs looked at money and credit market variables
and created an index out of four variables, among
them the spread between mortgage and govern-
ment repay and the ratio of money market deposits
compared to equity markets. This index reacted
dramatically during the breakdown of Lehman
Brothers. O’Neill underlined that he is not yet sure
if the index has any forward-looking capabilities,
but it would suggest that there are some grounds
for optimism.
He believes that many policymakers are too pes-
simistic. In his opinion, trend growth, both upwards
and downwards, does not change as much as every-
body claims. From 2004 through to 2008 trend
growth was not rising, as many economists assumed.
The cycle growth was going above the trend. He is
confident that the world growth trend is still
between 3 and 3.5 percent, and the average world
growth rate of the past 25 years is about 3.2 percent.
Due to a growth rate of 5 percent in the past four
years, many investors and economists believed that
the world’s growth trend had risen to 5 percent, but
this never really was the case.According to O’Neill it
is close to 3 percent. Following his view, the absence
of finance from over-leveraged Western banks does
not mean the end of the world growth trend.What is
most important for restarting growth again is confi-
dence in the financial system.Furthermore,the glob-
al inventory shredding must be stopped and an
offensive monetary and fiscal policy stimulus should
be applied to support consumers. As to when the
world economy will recover,Goldman Sachs sees for
the first time in nearly two years some indication
that the US consumption may stabilize in the second
half of this year.
Specific aspects for transition economies
In the second panel the financial market and eco-
nomic situation of various regions of the world were
presented. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Director for Policy
Studies at the European Bank for Reconstructionand Development (EBRD) started with an overview
of the challenges and prospects in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia.Unlike the advanced countries,the
transition economies barely felt the crisis in the first
half of 2008. At that time the Central European
Economies still experienced GDP and credit growth.
But the crisis hit hard in the beginning of October
2008.As a consequence, the costs of external financ-
ing went up and commodity prices weakened
sharply. Economic activity contracted unexpectedly
rapidly. By November 2008 most countries of the
CEE region experienced sharp drops in industrial
production, a weakening domestic credit growth, a
decline in capital inflows and inward FDI.Russia,for
instance, suffered a 16 percent decline in industrial
production in mid-February 2009 compared to
January 2008.
In the past few months the global outlook has dete-
riorated further and a recovery in the internation-
al financial markets is not expected until 2010.
Therefore, in January 2009, the EBRD forecast for
emerging Europe and Central Asia an average
growth of about zero for this year, with significant
downside risks. In general the EBRD has predict-
ed stagnation for these countries.Yet, a significant
cross-country heterogeneity is expected. Less eco-
nomically integrated countries like those in
Central Asia will experience a much lower but still
positive growth. A recession is likely to occur in
most better-integrated countries as well as in some
commodity-dependent countries. Twin currency
and full-fledged banking crisis have not appeared
yet in any of the countries, but some countries are
extremely close to it. Such an event could provoke
a major distortion of these countries’ economic
development.
What are the domestic policy challenges? As for the
financial sector policies,Zettelmeyer states that the
main focus should lie on the stabilization of the
core banking system.This includes the maintenance
of a credit deposit insurance scheme as well as to
combine liquidity support with a framework for
orderly consolidation or liquidation of non-viable,
non-systemic institutions. In some countries refi-
nancing of foreign currency debt and recapitaliza-
tion will be necessary. Concerning the monetary
and fiscal policies there is no one-size-fits-all policy.
Whether a country is able to afford expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies or not depends on fac-
tors such as the strength of the public balance
sheet, the credibility of monetary and fiscal institu-
tions, the currency composition of debt, domestic
inflation dynamics and external and public financ-
ing constraints.
Due to external financing constraints and exchange
rate pressures, the scope for domestic policy action
has become very limited in the last few months.
Again, this is why a decisive and coordinated inter-
national policy response is indispensable.To help the
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEE),
Western Europe has to respond with the following
instruments:
– Non-discriminatory domestic crisis response
packages in the West, because if Western
European countries help themselves it is good for
the CEE but only as long as aid packages do not
discriminate across borders,e.g.by requiring busi-
nesses to produce domestically.
– Refinance and,if needed,recapitalize CEE bank-
ing systems; some support can be provided by
multilateral development banks, but the most
support must come from parent banks and their
home governments.
– A strong direct role of European institutions; the
European Commission can help coordinate
national governments and the ECB can provide
targeted Euro liquidity support outside the
Eurozone.
– Scaling up of the crisis funds at the disposal of the
European Commission and the IMF.
A common initiative in support of CEE banking sys-
tems was already announced in February 2009 by the
EBRD, the European Investment Bank and the
World Bank Group with support from the IMF and
the European Commission – the so called “Joint IFI
Action Plan”.The core elements of this initiative are:
– a common needs assessment, both at the level of
CEE banking systems and at the international
bank group level,
– a coordinated approach to refinancing and recap-
italization, with burden sharing across IFIs, home
and host countries, and parent banks, and
– a contribution to the CEE banks amounting to
25 billion euros.
Lastly Zettelmeyer pointed out the opportunities
the crisis can offer. Crises sometimes spur reforms
and make it possible to improve governance and the
structure of financial sectors,especially in economies
with weak and relatively large domestic banking sys-
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tems. In addition, the crisis could help improve and
integrate the European financial architecture.
What about China?
China, a country which many experts, at least until
the fall of 2008, felt would successfully avoid the
global financial crisis, was then examined by Sonja
Opper, Professor of International Economics at
Lund University in Sweden. She observed that this
optimism soon weakened. But has the dragon really
been brought to its knees?
Since the fourth quarter of 2008, export and growth
rates in China declined rapidly. In December 2008
export growth was down to 2.8 percent. Considering
an export dependence of 40 percent of GDP, which
is comparable with Germany and Korea,this is clear-
ly a real threat. However, China’s export decline is
not only a domestic problem. Around 60 percent of
China’s exports originate from foreign funded firms
operating in China. Consequently, the effect of the
crisis will vary greatly across export commodity
groups.Whereas technical commodities like TV sets
and cameras experienced an extreme decline in
October 2008, the export of clothing or textiles
increased. Due to shrinking domestic spending,
imports are currently declining fast, too. But the
import decline can still offset the decline in export
growth,so that China’s overall trade surplus remains
largely unaffected. In addition, China’s domestic
demand has not yet fallen off. On the contrary, retail
sales increased by 21 percent in 2008. But the strong
domestic demand has not been able to stop the dra-
matic slowdown of industrial production,which grew
as little as 4.8 percent in December 2008.
The global crisis also poses a social challenge for
China. In the first quarter of 2009, the official
“urban” unemployment rate increased up to 5 per-
cent. Pessimists also forecast lay-offs of rural
migrant workers between 20 to 50 million. Based on
these assumptions, China could face a social crisis,
but luckily most rural migrants have family farms to
fall back on.
How can China respond to the financial crisis? With
foreign-exchange reserves of 1.95 trillion US dollars
by the end of 2008,a budget surplus of 1 to 2 percent
of GDP and a total public sector debt of a moderate
20 percent of GDP, China has optimal preconditions
to respond to the crisis. In addition the government
can rely on a state-controlled banking system to
increase lending in investment projects.
Already in November 2008, China responded to the
global crisis:the government announced an econom-
ic rescue package of 585 billion US dollars.To a large
extent, this package will be used for the moderniza-
tion of the infrastructure. In addition, the package
will help returning migrant workers who wish to
start up their own businesses,as well as for job train-
ing programs.A sum of 125 billion US dollars of the
package will go to social welfare expenditures and
tax reductions.
Despite these measures, the general business out-
look is still affected by the crisis. And, although
China’s policy response was very fast and financially
broad, critics point out that the efforts to support
domestic demand are insufficient. Since 2000,
domestic demand has experienced a rapid decrease
as a share of GDP,due to lagging wage increases and
high saving rates as a result of the weak social wel-
fare system. To overcome the crisis, China still has
much homework to do.It has to boost domestic con-
sumption by improving property rights security to
avoid easy expropriation of land owners. Further-
more, the social safety net and education funds need
to be extended to stimulate domestic demand.
In conclusion, Opper predicted that the current cri-
sis will be broader in scope and deeper in impact
than the Asian financial crisis. Due to China’s finan-
cially and institutionally favourable situation, how-
ever, the outlook is slightly optimistic. The current
adjustment problems, whether it is the weak domes-
tic demand or the country’s strong export depen-
dence, have been problems for China’s policy for
several years now. But if China uses the current cri-
sis to speed up necessary reforms,“then we might see
the Dragon re-emerging from this crisis stronger
than it was before”.
Effects of current crisis on major industries
Real estate sector
Tobias Just, Head of Sector and Real Estate Re-
search at Deutsche Bank Research, started the sec-
ond day of the conference by presenting the situa-
tion in the real estate sector.Regarding house prices,
the US real estate market reached – after a long
boom – its peak at the end of 2006.Since then,houseprices have fallen by about 20 percent and housing-
starts have declined by more than 50 percent. Not
only the US real estate market but also the real
estate markets particularly in Ireland, Spain, Britain
and now also in Eastern Europe have collapsed.The
overall slowdown in economic activity has had nega-
tive effects on commercial real estate markets. In
2008 alone, the overall transaction volume on the
European real estate investment markets decreased
by over 50 percent.
However, not all countries are affected the same
way. Especially Spain and Ireland had too much
new construction in the years before 2008. In the
last few years the supply of new housing units in
Spain exceeded the number of new households by
300,000 units per year. In Ireland, 90,000 new
homes were built, although it is a country of only
4 million residents.On the contrary Britain,France
and foremost Germany, which is currently produc-
ing 180,000 housing units a year, do not have such
a new-housing oversupply and will therefore be
less affected. Another important fact is that espe-
cially in Spain, Ireland and Britain commercial
property prices were at a very high level in 2007.
The drop in prices for office and industrial proper-
ties is now heightening the pressure from the hous-
ing market. Also the recession results in more
vacancies and significantly lower office rents as
well as less demand for new housing. Regarding
office rents in European cities, Tobias Just expects
a drop of up to more than 20 percent from peak to
trough – in Britain, Ireland, Spain and some East-
ern European countries the drop will be even sig-
nificantly larger.
When will the real estate markets bottom out?
According to Just, the US housing markets will bot-
tom out within a year. In Europe, in contrast, there
will be a prolongation for at least a year, varying for
each country.Especially with the strong correction in
Spain and Ireland, it will take at least 3 or 4 more
years for housing, as well as the commercial real
estate markets, to bottom out, construction will stay
muted and house prices will fall further. Germany
will not be affected to the same extent, however.
With a current production of 180,000 housing units,
Germany has merely a problem from the demand
side caused by the decline in disposable incomes.
Germany, however, is confronted with a supply-side
corrective. If the economy stays in recession in 2010,
Germany will also face declining house prices,
because the income variable will then become more
important and people will start to move due to rising
and persistent unemployment. But even in this
downside scenario, Tobias Just only expects a mod-
erate decline of about 2.5 percent for 2010; regional
differences, though, will remain pronounced. Hence,
considering rental yields,Germany would still have a
positive total return from real estate, which, in times
of crisis, is good news.
Oil industry
The oil industry has also been greatly affected by
the global crisis, as demonstrated by Enno Harks,
Political Adviser for BP Germany.The six years of
boom from 2003 to July 2008 turned to a bust
phase for the oil industry and the price of oil.
Demand, the prime driver of the price increase,
which peaked at 147 $/bbl, weakened, causing the
oil price to collapse. The lower income and lower
industrial production in the recession has had a
direct impact on the demand for private and indus-
trial transportation and petrochemical feed-stocks;
further price elasticity of demand proved surpris-
ingly high in 2008.Consequently,global oil demand
fell in 2008. Due to lower demand, energy prices
have fallen in the short term but could increase in
the medium term if investment recovers too slowly
to meet demand during an economic recovery.
With regard to the environmental impact, this
could lead to lower emissions in the short term,but
reduced investments in low-carbon energy could
lead to higher emissions in the long term.The near-
term oil demand expectations are very difficult to
gauge,but it is conceivable that over the next three
to six months oil demand will recede even more, as
imploding chemical and petrochemical industries
show no sign of immediate recovery. Likewise,
industrial road and air transportation are heavily
dependent on GDP growth: another oil price can-
not be ruled out in a prolonged recession.
However, oil price scenarios are also heavily
dependent on the extent to which OPEC’s quotas
are met, and currently they seem to be surprisingly
effective.
A big concern for a medium-term oil supply in
Europe, Enno Harks observed, is the decline in
Russian oil output in 2008,which is set to continue in
2009. Most of the reduction is due to the high taxes
in Russia, both on exports and on extraction. In the
last quarter of 2008 most oil companies exported at
a negative profit.This was not due to resource prob-
lems but mainly because of the tax system in Russia.
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While the government has brought the export tax
more in line with market reality,the so-called miner-
al extraction tax hampers investment in new oil
fields – risking production declines in the long run.
Obviously, in a crisis, when the Russian government
is in need of revenues, any reform of the tax system
becomes more difficult.
Investment cycles in the oil market, Harks pointed
out,are very different from those in other industries,
owing to the fact that only 15 percent of global oil
production originates from (western) private/listed
companies, the so-called international oil companies
(IOC), the rest being produced by state-held nation-
al oil companies (NOC). For the latter, investments
in upstream projects depends on many variables:
societal needs for the generated oil revenues, poli-
cies to avoid resource downsides, a national optimal
depletion path, OPEC quota obligations, etc., they
depend only to a lesser extent on the market balance
or the price. A lower reaction profile to the current
recession can thus be expected. At the same time,
privately held companies show reductions in their
2009 investment planning,albeit at differing degrees.
While among the IOCs,the oil majors peer group are
holding steady or slightly decreasing their invest-
ment portfolio, the small and mid-caps are strongly
reducing their investment budgets.
Chemical industry
With 29.5 percent of total sales,the EU is a key play-
er in the world chemical industry. But the global
financial crisis has seriously affected the EU chemi-
cal industry as well, as Igor Magdalenic, Senior
Advisor for Essenscia, the Belgian Federation of
Chemical and Life Sciences Industry, pointed out in
his presentation. In December 2008 the confidence
climate index in the chemical industry reached its
lowest level since January 1991. In 2008, for the first
time since 2003, production of chemicals (excluding
pharmaceuticals) declined. In October 2008, output
in the EU chemical industry (excluding pharmaceu-
ticals) dropped by 6.3 percent compared to the pre-
vious year. Almost all of the key industrial con-
sumers of chemicals have landed in recession,gener-
ating less demand for chemical products. Figures of
capacity production utilized by chemical companies
suggests a rapid fall in production: in the beginning
of 2009 chemical industries operated only at 77 per-
cent of their capacity, compared to 81.5 percent in
the last quarter of 2008 and to 82 percent as the long-
term average level.
Concerning the outlook for the chemical industry,
Igor Magdalenic expects a bottoming out not before
the third or fourth quarter of 2009 and a slight recov-
ery in 2010. No major improvement is expected
before 2011.Overall,over the next 15 years a growth
of 1.6 percent per year is expected for the European
chemical industry (excluding pharmaceuticals).
However, the development of the last ten years
shows that the EU has continually lost ground
against the emerging countries such as China and
India. Europe’s share of global output has declined
from 32.2 percent in 1997 to 29.5 percent in 2007.The
European chemical industry is also at a disadvantage
concerning the high costs for energy, labour force
and feedstock. But the EU chemical industry has
also widened its competitive edge with a high pace in
innovation accompanied by a qualified workforce.
The challenge for the European chemical industry is
to prevail against emerging competitors, improve
access to international markets, employ energy poli-
cies that take into account the needs of energy inten-
sive industries and to work for a reduction of the
regulatory burden.
Engineering industry
The business situation in the engineering industry
was presented by Anders Rune, Chief Economist at
the Association of Swedish Engineering Industries in
Stockholm. As expected the economic situation for
the European engineering industry, which mainly
includes metal goods (30 percent), machinery
(35 percent) and electrical machinery (15 percent)
does not look any better than other industries. The
business cycle in this industry is more pronounced
than that of other manufacturing industries: com-
pared with the level in 2005 the production of the
European engineering industry grew by nearly a
quarter until mid-2008.In the second half of last year
new order bookings abruptly started to plummet and
the breakdown did not lose momentum until the first
quarter of 2009.In other words,production contract-
ed already in the last quarter of 2008, although the
annual production of the European engineering
industry recorded a slight increase in production for
the year as a whole. The decline of production has,
however, continued in early 2009, while the capacity
utilization has reached record lows. It is expected
that, on average for 2009, production will shrink at a
double digit rate as compared with the preceding
year. The expectations for 2010 are bleak for the
engineering industry. Even if there is a recovery innew orders, it will take some time until production
gets under way.
Automotive industry
The automotive industry has been hit by its worst
crisis since 1945. The current situation and the out-
look were presented by Christophe Chabert, who is
responsible for strategy and business development
at Renault headquarters in France. In February
2009, the Japanese automobile market had its sev-
enth negative month,which is the biggest drop in 35
years. In the same month, the US automobile mar-
ket was at its lowest level since 1982. Europe as a
whole experienced a decline in new car sales of
almost 20 percent in February 2009. Spain had a
downturn of almost 50 percent, whereas Germany
had an increase of more than 20 percent, primarily
induced by a massive car-scrapping scheme.Western
European car production, which ranged between 14
and 16 million from January 1990 to January 2008,
dropped sharply down to 10 million cars at the
beginning of 2009.
The automotive industry is now “under fire”.There
are rapidly deteriorating markets in both advanced
and emerging countries with a global shrinkage of
the total industry volume. The industry also cur-
rently faces external and internal pressures.
Environmental regulations and pressure on house-
holds’ disposable incomes can be characterized as
the external pressures; the supply chain optimiza-
tion (e.g.inventories and shut-downs) are the inter-
nal pressures.
In many countries, public automotive schemes have
already been implemented, for example national
CO2-based “bonus-malus”-type regulations and
state grants (including loans on preferential terms,
loan guarantees and other government guarantees),
but these remain highly uncoordinated.According to
Chabert,sales are still declining in Europe and there
is no sign of consolidation.Throughout Europe there
is an average annual production capacity of 11 to
12 million cars. In order to be profitable, the car
industry needs a utilization rate of at least 80 to
85 percent.The average utilization rate in Europe is
now below 65 percent. Since this is just an average,
the rates of some car makers are even lower than
50 or 40 percent.
The future recovery, Chabert observed, will not only
be about new products and services. It is also about
new business models and reconceiving the value
chains between the different actors of the industry.
And even though the figures are frightening, the
future of the automotive industry could be bright,
because people will still need individual mobility. In
addition,climate change and CO2 regulations offer a
great opportunity to benefit from new technology
and there is still room for an improving the classic
thermal internal combustion engine technology.
Electronics
The last industry on the second day of the confer-
ence was the electronic industry analyzed by David
Enu, Senior Consultant of DECISION in Paris.The
electronic industry, with total sales of 1,138 billion
euros in 2008, is a crucial industry, since most other
manufacturing and service industries need its prod-
ucts as drivers for innovation and productivity.
Together with China (with 27 percent),Europe (with
21 percent) enjoys a leading position in world elec-
tronic production.
Since 2000 the electronic “mass” market has grown
strongly. It represents about 50 percent of the indus-
try value and includes consumer goods that are man-
ufactured in millions of units. Between 2001 and
2006 its volume tripled to 800 million. Now we have
passed the 1 billion unit mark. By 2012 further
growth of up to 3.5 billion units is expected, in spite
of the current disruption induced by the financial
and economic crisis.
From the 1970s until the 1990s, electronic equip-
ment was largely produced for government and
enterprises. Nowadays, the electronic industry has
new driving forces:the individuals and social needs,
which includes power efficiency,health and comfort
and security. The electronic industry is character-
ized by a high pace of innovation. Especially the
semiconductors industry followed an upward trend
with an average annual growth rate of around
11 percent between 1963 and 2007.Thanks to mas-
sive R&D expenditures,electronics has permanent-
ly penetrated new application areas. However, the
European share of the global semiconductors pro-
duction dropped from 15 to 11 percent between
2000 and 2007.
As all other industries, the current economic insta-
bility is causing major uncertainties in the electronic
industry. To demonstrate the impact of the crisis,
David Enu presented some medium-term scenarios.
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Assuming that there had not been a global crisis the
growth rate for 2009 and 2010 was estimated at
5.0 and 5.5 percent respectively. An average annual
growth rate of 6.1 percent was calculated up to 2012.
The scenario “crisis and a fast recovery (in the fourth
quarter of 2009)” would result in an average medi-
um-term growth rate of 3.1 percent. The most pes-
simistic scenario “crisis and slow recovery (in the
fourth quarter of 2010)” would result in an average
growth rate of 1.2 percent. For the less-likely fast
recovery forecast,the electronic market in important
regions is as follows:for Europe the market will stag-
nate in the period from 2007 to 2012 and not grow at
an average annual rate of 3.1 percent as in 2003 to
2007. Enu reckons with an average growth rate of
5.6 percent for China and 3.1 percent for the world.
The respective figures for the preceding period were
15.8 and 7 percent, respectively.